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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case challenges the constitutional validity of a police officer’s warrantless arrest of a
parolee, Jesus George Ayala, without probable cause to believe Mr. Ayala had committed any
crime, and without any other valid arrest authority.
The police officer arrested Mr. Ayala based solely on the oral request of a parole officer
to locate and pick up Mr. Ayala for absconding from his parole supervision. The parole officer
told police he intended to issue an agent’s warrant, but before the agent’s warrant was prepared,
the police officer arrested Mr. Ayala.

During the search incident to that arrest, the police

discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Mr. Ayala’s possession.
Mr. Ayala moved to suppress, claiming the police violated his constitutional rights
against unreasonable seizures and searches by arresting him without a warrant, without probable
cause to believe he was committing a crime, and without other valid arrest authority. The district
court denied the motion, concluding that the parole officer’s oral request to arrest Mr. Ayala
provided police both probable cause to make the arrest, and the authority to act on behalf of the
parole officer, as his agents, to make a warrantless arrest.
On appeal, Mr. Ayala contends that the district court’s conclusions are erroneous and that
the decision denying his suppression motion should be reversed. This Reply Brief is necessary
to address the State’s argument that probable cause to believe a person has violated his parole
supervision agreement provides the police officers with constitutional probable cause to arrest.
Regarding his excessive sentence, Mr. Ayala respectfully refers the Court to his Appellant’s
Brief, at pages 14-17.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings are set forth in Mr. Ayala’s
Appellant’s Brief, at pages 1-4, and are not be repeated in this Reply Brief.

2

ISSUES

I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ayala’s motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ayala’s Motion To Suppress

A.

The District Court Erroneously Concluded That Knowledge Of Mr. Ayala’s Status As An
Parole Absconder Provided The Police Officer Probable Cause To Arrest Mr. Ayala; The
State’s Argument To The Contrary Is Without Merit
The State asserts on appeal that, “[b]ecause the arrest for the parole violation was

supported by probable cause, the district court correctly found no constitutional violation in the
arrest.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.4.) This assertion is incorrect. The district court’s conclusion –
that knowledge of Mr. Ayala’s absconding status gave probable cause to make the arrest – was
erroneous. Under the long-standing probable cause exception to the warrant requirement, “a
warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable [and lawful] under the Fourth Amendment where
there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” State
v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, _, 402 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2017) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.
146, 152 (2004)) (brackets original to Lee opinion) (emphasis added); see also Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174–78 (2008) (an arrest is “lawful” under the Fourth Amendment if
“officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence”).
See also State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 888 (2015) (holding the Idaho Constitution’s “probable
cause to arrest” standard authorizes police to make warrantless arrests for a “felony” or “for a
public offense committed or attempted in his presence.”)
As demonstrated in Appellant’s Brief, absconding from parole supervision is not a crime
or public offense in Idaho.

(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)
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Consequently, the police officers’

knowledge that Mr. Ayala may have 1 absconded from his parole supervision did not give the
police officers probable cause to arrest him.

The district court’s contrary conclusion is

erroneous.
1.

The State Has Mischaracterized Mr. Ayala’s Argument

The State claims that Mr. Ayala is arguing that “the constitution … does not allow arrests
for probation or parole violations that are not independent crimes” (Respondent’s Brief, p.4), and
that “that violators of probation and parole are entitled to remain at large indefinitely”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.5). This characterization of Mr. Ayala’s argument is incorrect. What
Mr. Ayala argues here is simply that the constitutional “probable cause” standard, which
authorizes the police to make warrantless arrests, applies where the police have probable cause to
believe the person has committed a crime. Under this well-established standard, probable cause
was lacking in this case and the district court’s conclusion to the contrary was erroneous.
2.

The State’s Reliance On Morrissey v. Brewer Is Misplaced

The burden rests with the State to establish that the warrantless arrest of Mr. Ayala was
valid, see State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642 (2017), and the State has failed to carry that burden. The
State claims that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), supports the district court’s
conclusion that constitutional probable cause to arrest may be based on a parole violation.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.5.) This is the sole legal authority cited by the State. (See generally
Respondent’s Brief.)

However, Morrissey deals exclusively with the requirements of due

process after a parolee has been arrested and before his parole may be revoked. Id. The decision

1

The evidence shows only that the police officers received information that Mr. Ayala was
“wanted” by his parole officer, and that the parole officer intended to issue an agent’s warrant;
however, there is no evidence that the police officers were apprised of the actual facts underlying
the parole officer’s request. (See generally Tr.)
5

is not concerned with the parolee’s initial arrest, except to observe that the event typically occurs
at the direction of the parole officer, and that it may take place at some distance from the
parolee’s institution. Id. This opinion provides no authority for the State’s proposition that the
Fourth Amendment’s “probable cause” standard allows a police officer to make an arrest based
on his belief that the person is in violation of his parole.
3.

The State’s Reliance On Virginia V. Moore And State V. Green Is Misplaced

The State’s reliance on Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. at 171, and State v. Green, 158 Idaho
884 (2015) is also misplaced. (See Respondent’s Brief, p.6.) Contrary to the State’s claim,
Mr. Ayala does not argue on appeal that “the arrest was invalid under I.C. § 20-227”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.5), and contrary to the State’s argument (Respondent’s Brief, p.6), he
does not argue that the officers violated that statute. Rather, as detailed in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Ayala’s argument is that the police officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
arresting him without a warrant, without constitutional probable cause, and without any other
valid authority to make the arrest. Mr. Ayala’s only appellate argument2 regarding I.C. § 202273 is that the parole officer’s arrest authority granted by that statute was never invoked: the
2

Below, Mr. Ayala made an argument that the failure to comply with the statute warranted
suppression under the Fourteenth Amendment, but as noted in Appellant’s Brief, at page 6, n.6,
he has not pursued that argument on appeal.
3
Idaho Code § 20-227 (1) provides,
Any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee or probationer … without
a warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so, by
giving such officer a written statement hereafter referred to as an agent’s
warrant, setting forth that the parolee or probationer … in the judgment of said
parole or probation officer, violated … the conditions of his parole or
probation ….
I.C. § 20-227 (1) (emphasis added). This statute grants a parole officer the authority to
(1) make a warrantless arrest of a parolee, or (2) “deputize” any other “officer with arrest
power” to do so “by giving such officer a written statement” known as an agent’s
warrant. Id. The statute prescribes who the parole officer can deputize (i.e., any other
officer with arrest power), and how the parole officer must deputize such officer (i.e., by
6

parole officer did not make the arrest, and he did not deputize any other officer to do so until
after police had taken Mr. Ayala into custody and searched him. (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)
B.

The State’s Alternative Legal Theory For Upholding The Warrantless Search – That The
Search Can Be Justified Based On Mr. Ayala’s Diminished Expectations Of Privacy – Is
Without Merit And Should Be Rejected
The State agrees that the district court erred to the extent it found the warrantless arrest

was justified based on Mr. Ayala’s diminished expectations of privacy as a parolee.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.6.) However, the State argues, in a footnote, that the police officer’s
search conducted incident to the constitutionally unlawful arrest may be justified by his reduced
expectation of privacy. (Respondent’s Brief, p.6, n.1.) The State’s argument should be rejected
for several reasons.
First, the State did not raise this argument below. As the Idaho Supreme Court clearly
has stated:
“This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” Mickelsen
Const., Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 405, 299 P.3d 203, 212 (2013) (quoting
Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812, 252 P.3d 71, 93
(2011)). “Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal,
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the
lower court.” Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through Dep’t of Pub.
Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979); Marchbanks v.
Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho
79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968) (“We have held generally that this court will not
review issues not presented in the trial court, and that parties will be held to the
theory on which the cause was tried.”).
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017).

giving such officer a written statement). Id. Here, the parole officer failed to invoke his
arrest authority under the statute: he did not make the arrest, and he did not deputize any
other officer to do so until after police had taken Mr. Ayala into custody and searched
him.
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Second, even if this Court were to consider the State’s newly-raised argument, this Court
should reject the argument because, as argued in Appellant’s Brief, at page 8, the arrest in this
case violated Mr. Ayala’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the fruits of the search conducted
incident to that unlawful arrest must therefore be suppressed under Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963), and State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992). Mr. Ayala’s
status as a parolee does not deprive him of that remedy.
Third, and as noted in Appellant’s Brief, the State did not introduce the terms or
conditions of Mr. Ayala’s parole supervision agreement; because parolees’ and probationers’
privacy interests are diminished by the terms and conditions of their parole or probation
agreements,4 the extent to which Mr. Ayala’s privacy expectations may have been diminished by
such terms or conditions cannot be evaluated by this Court. Specifically, there is no evidence
before this Court of any term or condition requiring that Mr. Ayala submit to searches by the
police.
Thus, the State has failed to carry its burden of showing that the warrantless arrest of
Mr. Ayala was constitutionally lawful. Contrary to the conclusions of the district court, the
police lacked probable cause to arrest because they had no reason to believe Mr. Ayala was
committing any crime; and the State has failed to establish that the arrest fell within any other
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The exclusionary rule should be applied in this

4

See, e.g., State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 911 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Cruz’ parole condition
significantly diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy because it subjected him to
searches of person or property, including residence and vehicle, at any time and place and did
not expressly require reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds”); United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (probationer’s consent to suspicionless searches by probation officers and
law enforcement officers, found in probation agreement, significantly diminished probationer’s
reasonable expectation of privacy); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (California
parolee’s privacy expectations significantly diminished by state-imposed circumstances
8

case to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of that illegal seizure, and the district court’s
denial of the suppression motion should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Ayala
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of judgment and
commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings. Alternatively, he asks that this Court reduce his sentence,
or else vacate his sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing.
DATED this 25th day of April 2018.

_____/S/____________________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

“including the plain terms of the parole search condition” subjecting parolees to warrantless
arrests and suspicionless searches by both law enforcement and probation officers).
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